Overview

Misrepresentation under paragraph 40(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) is broader than fraud. It covers directly or indirectly misstating or withholding a material fact that induces or could induce an error in administering the Act. Intent is not required: an applicant may be found inadmissible for an inaccurate answer, an omitted charge or refusal, a fraudulent document, or information filed by a representative without the applicant’s knowledge.

The usual consequence is five years of inadmissibility. For a determination made outside Canada, the period generally runs from the final inadmissibility determination; for one made in Canada, it generally runs from enforcement of the removal order. A foreign national also cannot apply for permanent resident status during the applicable period: IRPA, ss. 40(2)(a) and 40(3).

In June 2026, the Federal Court released 211 decisions. Of these, 199 decisions concerned immigration law. Seven of those decisions focused on misrepresentation under paragraph 40(1)(a).

Of the seven cases, two applications for judicial review were allowed—Vasilev and Hwangbo—and five were dismissed—Ekpe, Makhija, Guclu, Righetti, and Shivanshu.

The June 2026 Federal Court decisions reinforce a practical message: procedural fairness matters, but applicants remain responsible for controlling their files, verifying what is submitted, and correcting errors promptly.

Bottom line: The two successful cases turned on procedural fairness and ineffective representation. They involved an undisclosed concern and proven ineffective representation. No cases expanded the narrow “innocent mistake” exception.

The Legal Framework in Brief

Paragraph 40(1)(a) requires:

1. a direct or indirect misrepresentation or withholding of a fact; and
2. materiality—the fact that induced or could have induced an error in administering the IRPA.

The provision does not require intent or knowledge: Shivanshu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 879 at paras. 14–15. The narrow innocent-mistake exception applies only where an applicant honestly and reasonably believed the information was accurate and knowledge of the error was beyond their control. This includes both a subjective question (did the applicant honestly believe the information was accurate?) and an objective one (was that belief reasonable?). Lack of due diligence may prevent the exception from arising: Shivanshu, at paras. 16–18; Righetti v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 830 at paras. 62–63.

June 2026 Results at a Glance

Decision	Result	Central point
Vasilev v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 716	Allowed	A letter stating only that a bank statement was fraudulent did not disclose the officer’s specific concern about an allegedly altered balance. The applicants were denied a meaningful opportunity to respond: paras. 22–26.
Hwangbo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 771	Allowed	Detailed, uncontested evidence showed that a former consultant knew of a Canadian criminal charge but failed to advise the applicant to update her pending application. The Court found incompetence and prejudice: paras. 24–31.
Ekpe v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 727	Dismissed	A fairness letter identifying a bank statement as likely fraudulent disclosed the gist of the concern. New genuine bank documents did not authenticate the statement originally filed: paras. 4–10.
Makhija v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 743	Dismissed	The applicant did not answer the fairness letter. A later ghost-consultant explanation was not before the officer, who had no duty to investigate: paras. 4–10.
Guclu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 747	Dismissed	On an appeal based on humanitarian and compassionate factors, the IAD could weigh establishment against the proven misrepresentation, credibility concerns, and lack of remorse when deciding humanitarian relief: paras. 10–22.
Righetti v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 830	Dismissed	Correcting an omission after IRCC detected it did not cure the misrepresentation. IRCC could refuse withdrawal once an active misrepresentation concern existed: paras. 39–54.
Shivanshu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 879	Dismissed	The applicant failed to exercise due diligence when a consultant filed fraudulent records from a college he had never attended. The officer was not required to apply the innocent-mistake exception: paras. 21–27.

Key Trends and Emerging Principles

1. Applicants remain responsible for their filings

Shivanshu and Makhija confirm that “my representative did it” is generally insufficient. In Shivanshu, several consultants had said the desired permit was unavailable before one promised success. That history increased the need to verify the consultant and review the filing. Because the applicant did not verify the consultant’s integrity or review the application, the officer was not required to consider the innocent-mistake exception. Makhija reached a similar result after a fraudulent guaranteed investment certificate was submitted with a study permit application. In Makhija, the applicant neither answered IRCC’s procedural fairness letter nor put the ghost-consultant explanation before the officer. Information submitted by another person may still be attributed to the applicant, subject to the narrow innocent-mistake exception: Shivanshu, at paras. 21–27; Makhija, at paras. 4–6, 10, and 14.

Hwangbo is the limited counterpoint. A representative-error claim can succeed where evidence proves incompetence, a reasonable probability of a different result, and proper notice to the former representative. Detailed sworn evidence established that the consultant knew about the criminal charge in time to update the application but advised that it was irrelevant. The consultant did not intervene or file sworn evidence, and the applicant was not cross-examined: Hwangbo, at paras. 14–15 and 24–31. The Court accepted her account and found a reasonable probability that timely disclosure would have avoided the misrepresentation refusal. A bare allegation against a former representative will not meet this standard.

2. Fairness letters must disclose the real concern (but context matters)

In Vasilev, IRCC told the principal applicant only that his Sberbank statement had been determined to be fraudulent. The undisclosed concern was much more specific: digital verification allegedly showed a balance of 600,000 rubles, while the submitted statement showed 4.6 million rubles. The applicant responded that repeated file compression may have affected the document’s appearance, but he was never told that the account balance itself was the issue: paras. 22–24. In Ekpe, however, identifying the bank document as likely fraudulent conveyed the gist of the concern; the bank had denied both authorship and that the statement reflected the applicant’s account: paras. 4–6.

The cases do not create a bright-line rule. Their records help explain the different results: the response in Vasilev missed the undisclosed balance issue, while the response in Ekpe did not authenticate the impugned statement. The question is whether the letter, read in context, lets the applicant address the concern driving the decision.

Righetti adds a further limit. Once a fairness letter clearly identifies the inaccurate answer and the relevant prior events, an officer does not necessarily have to issue a second letter or hold an interview merely because the officer finds the applicant’s explanation implausible. Where the response itself puts the applicant’s knowledge and credibility in issue, the officer may assess that explanation against the existing record: Righetti, at paras. 33–38.

3. Authenticate the original document; do not merely replace it

Ekpe provides one of the month’s clearest practical lessons. After IRCC questioned a bank statement, the applicant supplied a new statement and a new bank letter confirming that the new statement was genuine. The Court held that this did not answer the real question: whether the document originally filed with the application was authentic. A procedural fairness response is an opportunity to prove or explain the original document, not simply to substitute a new genuine document for one that IRCC believes is fraudulent: paras. 5 and 7–9.

For banks, accountants, employers, schools, and other issuers, any confirmation should precisely identify the original by date, account or reference number, amount, and method of issuance. It should directly explain any discrepancy involving formatting, compression, translation, metadata, or verification codes. Preserve the original electronic file, transmission records, and the issuer’s contact details where possible.

IRCC need not pursue additional investigation where the response does not answer the original concern. In Ekpe, the officer did not have to contact the bank again about a letter that failed to authenticate the original; in Makhija, the officer had no duty to investigate the unexplained failure to respond: Ekpe, at paras. 7–9; Makhija, at para. 10.

4. Early correction helps; late correction or withdrawal may not

In Righetti, disclosure of three prior work-permit refusals only after IRCC detected the omission was relevant but not curative. The applicant had also received an earlier misrepresentation refusal that was later set aside on procedural grounds. IRCC could refuse withdrawal once the concern was active in order to protect program integrity: paras. 39–49. Makhija and Shivanshu similarly confirm that requesting withdrawal does not prevent a finding.

In Hwangbo, disclosure about four months before the fairness letter likely would have changed the result; the Court separately noted that withdrawal may then have been available: paras. 29–30. The safe lesson is prompt advice and action—not that correction or withdrawal guarantees protection.

5. Materiality is about the decision-making process

A fact may be material even if it would not necessarily cause refusal. It is enough that it could affect the assessment or trigger verification, questions, an interview, or another admissibility inquiry. In Righetti, the omitted refusals were material because they formed part of the applicant’s immigration history and related to eligibility concerns; concise reasons were sufficient where the connection was evident: paras. 50–54.

Applicants should address materiality in the fairness response. In Ekpe, the applicant raised it only on judicial review, and the Court did not fault the officer for a brief analysis where the notes reflected the correct test: para. 10.

6. Misrepresentation can shape later humanitarian relief

Guclu concerned relief from the consequences of a conceded misrepresentation. The applicant, a permanent resident, did not dispute that he had failed to disclose criminal charges and proceedings in Malta. He instead asked the IAD to grant relief from the removal order on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.

The Federal Court upheld the IAD’s refusal. The IAD acknowledged the applicant’s establishment, but it could balance it against the seriousness of the conduct, credibility concerns, and lack of remorse. Positive establishment may therefore be neutralized in the overall weighing: paras. 10–12.

Lack of remorse was relevant because the misrepresentation was proven and conceded, yet the applicant said he would do nothing differently. The Court distinguished this from penalizing someone for denying an unproven allegation: paras. 18–22. Applicants bear the burden of proving the humanitarian case; the IAD need not fill evidentiary gaps or calculate hardship for them: paras. 14 and 17.

Practical Takeaways for Professionals

Before filing

• Review every form with the applicant, especially questions about charges, convictions, refusals, prior applications, employment, education, and immigration history.
• Treat pending charges and unsuccessful applications as disclosure issues even without a conviction, written refusal, or continuing inadmissibility. Do not assume an event is irrelevant merely because another application was later approved.
• Give the applicant a complete copy of exactly what was filed and proof of submission. The applicant should retain access to all email, portals, and IRCC correspondence.
• Verify third-party records and reconcile names, dates, amounts, account numbers, and transaction histories before filing.
• Where a document comes through an intermediary, confirm it independently with the apparent issuer. Professionals supplying records should keep a copy of what they issued and be prepared to explain how it was generated, delivered, and verified.

If an error is discovered

• Act promptly. A voluntary correction before detection is better positioned than one made after a fairness letter or verification inquiry.
• Obtain legal advice before seeking withdrawal; it is not an automatic escape from an active concern.
• Preserve a chronology showing who prepared the answer or document, when the problem was discovered, and what followed.

If IRCC sends a fairness letter

• Treat the deadline as urgent and respond to the precise concern about the answer or document originally filed.
• Obtain issuer confirmation that clearly identifies and authenticates the original; provide a coherent chronology and supporting or sworn evidence where appropriate.
• Address materiality and, if supported by the evidence, the innocent-mistake test.
• If former-representative incompetence is alleged, give the representative notice, preserve their response, and obtain advice about the Federal Court’s Allegations Protocol. Record what the representative knew, when they knew it, and what advice they gave.

Conclusion

The June decisions did not change the legal test; they clarified its practical operation. Applicants succeeded where IRCC failed to disclose the real concern or where evidence showed that ineffective representation probably caused the result. They failed where the original document remained unauthenticated, key facts were not put before the officer, due diligence was lacking, or correction came only after detection.

For applicants and supporting professionals: control the file, verify every answer and document, disclose developments promptly, and treat a fairness letter as an evidentiary problem requiring a precise response.